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1This is particularly the case for ‘critical’ IPE (see, for example, Gill and Law, 1989; Cox, 1987;
Jenson, et al., 1993).  In addition to those within IPE that espouse a critical approach to globalisation, there
are cross discipline critical approaches, for example, in the fields of economic geography (e.g., Corbridge,
Martin and Thrift, 1994; McDowell and Court, 1994 [who are multidisciplinary]; Shachar and Oberg, 1990;
Hodder and Lee, 1974), and Green political thought (e.g., Dobson, 1990; Elkington and Burke, 1987;
Merchant, 1990).
2Feminist authors note the problems inherent in discipline imposed ‘level’ divisions that blur the ways
in which phenomena can be simultaneously multi-levelled.  Research at the systemic level, for example, is
often ‘abstract’ and ‘gender-neutral.’  It is crucial not to simply disregard the discussion on ‘macro’ processes,
but rather to seek places for feminist incursions and, as I have suggested, cross-levelled linkages therein.
Dramatic global and local phenomena associated with economic restructuring are reshaping the
ways we view interpersonal and transnational relations.  The relationship of citizens to their
governments, of governments to governments, and of non-governmental organisations to each
other is altering in ways that challenge our understanding of government and governance, and
power and politics.  Much of the discourse associated with global restructuring and globalisation
casts the ‘new world order’ (NWO) as an inevitable, primarily economic process bringing
positive change.  But this emphasis on economic processes masks a multitude of broader and
deeper dimensions of the emerging global order.
Transnationally, restructuring and globalisation discourse has a complex, many-faceted
political, social, and economic impact.  Traditional academic ‘disciplines,’ with their often
narrowly drawn paradigms of understanding and explanation, have been unable to cope with the
complex impact of global restructuring and have struggled individually to understand the
subtleties and intricacies of these processes and the accompanying discourse.  With linkages to
several traditional fields, international political economy (IPE) has emerged as an area especially
well positioned to deal with the interdisciplinary nature of globalisation.1
Given its multidimensional impact, academics and policy makers alike have expressed a
need to broaden discussions of global restructuring to include more than the military-centric
research which has traditionally received the majority of attention and funding.  A dramatic
reordering of priorities has resulted in a new urgency to understand international political
economy.  In particular, there has been increased appreciation for the relevance of global finance
and its relationship with governmental and non-governmental politics.  The extent to which
issues and effects of global finance are interwoven with all ‘levels’2 of social life is beginning to
be realised in more systematic and interdisciplinary ways in the literature of IPE, Political
Science, Economic Geography, or Green approaches.  However, in spite of the need for more
critical and inclusive perspectives on the global, national, and sub-national repercussions of
trends in financial policy making, the majority of current research is relatively conservative and
3While I am concerned with the position and treatment of women, just ‘adding’ women as a group
or a category to current analyses of global finance may prove interesting yet inadequate.  We must also
understand gender (as a socially constructed concept of masculinity/femininity and male/female), or the
“social construction of power inequalities constituted by the hierarchical dichotomy — pervasive in
discourses, practices, institutions and identities — of masculine over/against feminine.” (Peterson,
forthcoming: fn. 1, p.1)  However, it is also not sufficient to study gender or women, as categories of research,
without reference to race, class, ethnicity, heterosexism, etc., given that these categories are interconnected
and not mutually exclusive.  The term feminist helps us to identify a body of research that includes questions
about women and gender, but may also seek linkages to broader research on other social categories.  This
paper contributes to a larger body of research with an acknowledged political agenda that seeks the
empowerment of women and men by exploring problematic structures and processes in order to eliminate
multi-levelled oppression.  This ‘broader brush’ construct then is more useful particularly as we are exploring
areas of potential research.
4Specifically, micro level research focuses on the individual, macro approaches emphasize the
state/system level, and meso approaches examine the structures linking micro and macro phenomenon.  Elson
discusses the recent move in economics to introduce a ‘new’ level of analysis, the meso: “Meso analysis
concerns itself with the structures that mediate between individuals and the economy considered as a whole,
by providing economic signals, costs and benefits, and typically focuses on markets, private-sector firms and
public sector services.” (Elson, 1994: 33)  While the addition of a level may help to break down the
micro/macro dichotomy, it may also add more complexity.  Elson not only discusses the ‘new’ level, but also
discusses “feminist strategies for enabling economic analysis at these three levels to contribute towards the
empowerment of women, rather than perpetuation of their subordination.” (Elson, 1994: 33).  This strategy
applies in this paper as well, but the concept of empowerment is extended to all who are disempowered by
both the operation and the study of global finance.
non-critical.  Alternative perspectives outside of traditionally defined economic nationalist,
liberal, and radical (read Marxian and/or Gramscian) divisions are missing.  While critical
perspectives have explored the ways in which the influence of the liberal financial order extends
beyond the economic into cultural, political, and social aspects of life, feminist3 approaches can
contribute to this research by providing additional insights about the effects of identity politics,
as well as the ways that dominant powers operate across micro, meso, and macro levels.4  This
linkage may prove especially useful in efforts to improve accessibility by demystifying global
finance for those who are affected by its processes but who are left out of its policy making
circles.  It is at this juncture that feminist frameworks and perspectives could be enlightening.
Over the years, feminist IPE interventions have linked the public and private roles of
individuals, institutions, and broader global structures, and have thus improved our
understanding of these processes and our ability to ask new questions.  This research often
highlights reproductive and productive aspects of the economy, as well as the broader social and
cultural implications of the current environment.  Their work has primarily focused on structural
adjustment and development, shedding light, for example, on the problematic and gendered
implementation of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) policy in ‘third
5This includes M. Cohen’s (1994) work focusing on Canadian restructuring.
6Meta-theory provides us with an understanding of the process of theorising, or knowledge
production.  It is at this level that decisions are made that will affect the inclusion or exclusion of certain
concepts or ideas, and the form of rationality that will be invoked in the realm of global finance.
7It is important to recognise the extent to which nation-state research fails to make the cross-level
connection required for research on restructuring.  For example, current feminist and mainstream economic
research on the relationship between Hungary, the IMF, and the global financial community does not
systematically consider the impact dynamics of the global financial market or the macro/micro intersection
of global finance and economic, political and social restructuring in Hungary.  For example, the current
regime has moved to a system that includes a flexible exchange rate system.  The rapid change in exchange
world’ contexts.  Yet, while early work on ‘restructuring’ and macro economic policy in certain
advanced capitalist contexts has contributed to our collective understanding of these processes,5
consistent multi-levelled linkages and an inclusion of questions of global finance within a global
framework remain little explored areas of research.
Feminist views of the gender politics of global finance may suggest new, otherwise
unobserved questions about common issues such as exchange rate policy, interest rate policy,
capital flight, and bond rating processes as they relate to current globalising trends.  This
research can complement existing perspectives on these issues.  For example, Sinclair (1994)
explores the ways in which non-governmental global governance is occurring in secret processes
of credit rating.  Missing from Sinclair’s analysis is attention to existing identity undertones
influencing both agency, composition, and the actual procedures and protocols utilised to make
rating decisions.  Exploration of the gendered knowledge creation and the location and form of
power in global finance might offer new insights into the politics of bond rating.  The secretive
nature of this process renders it potentially problematic as a form of regulation or governance
because it operates outside more accountable forms of governance.  By overlooking the identity
politics of this and other forms of governance, existing restructuring (and democratisation)
research provides only a partial and inadequate view of current global processes.
There is a need for feminist work to explore the gendered processes and the gendered
effects of global finance and global restructuring that is situated at the intersection of IPE,
economics, and politics.  In order to examine the theory, meta-theory,6 and practise of global
finance through a gender-sensitive lens, I situate my research within a broader feminist project. 
With a theoretical framework informed particularly by current feminist sociological,
post-colonial, critical economic, structural adjustment, and development literature, as well as
mainstream political economy literature, I will begin to address the multi-levelled social,
political, and economic inter-connections of restructuring processes.7  These processes and
rates has a differential effect on sectors of the economy that are themselves gendered, such as the textile and
service sectors.
8Language or jargon that is inaccessible is problematic for all academic and policy writers, be they
critical or non-critical.  It is important not to mistake complex language for a more sophisticated argument.
This criticism has also been made about feminist revisions of political science.  The challenge for all
academics is that it is sometimes difficult for those in our own fields to understand our work unless it is
written in familiar language.  Of course, this means that for those outside of our small academic circles, our
work is often opaque and its relevance to daily life is often unclear.
9If global finance has become a new form of high politics, valued in new ways by governments, we
need to understand the internal dynamics and operations of this area, with attention to this new importance.
Who determines the form and content of finance discourse and how does this affect access and accountability
for those outside the inner circles of global finance?  Decisions taken far from existing parameters of
accountability affect governments and individuals alike who are unable to participate in these decisions.
effects come to light, in part, through an examination of the discourse created by economics,
IPE, and global finance.  As well, utilising a small set of practises associated with global finance,
I examine the links between feminist macro-economic policy literature and the operations of
finance on a global scale, and conclude by suggesting some potential directions for future
research that might promote fresh thinking about IPE and global finance, its discourse, the
centrality of ‘the market,’ and the increasingly complex social and political relationship between
production and reproduction.
What are the gender politics of power and knowledge at play here governing inclusion
and exclusion, and the control of language and meaning?  The discursive dynamics that
discourage feminists from engaging in the economics/IPE/global finance discourse also hinder
efforts by mainstream approaches to consider alternative ‘critical’ dimensions beyond solely
class-based approaches.  When an exclusive and inaccessible language or jargon8 is created and
perpetuated, particular understandings are privileged.  What is striking about the growing
recognition of the political importance of global finance is the increased interest in
understanding its linkage to other areas of politics.  Global finance is not merely more politically
relevant, but is also a likely location for a type of high politics which is similar in form and
operation to the power politics of security studies.9
Discourse and the High Politics of Global Finance
Feminist academics have become increasingly sensitive to the role that discourse
and representation play in the subordination of women.  A discourse can be
judged as sexist when women are either ignored or debased, and patriarchal when
it assumes and inscribes a sexual division of labour into a representation, thereby
denying women and men the same access to self-determination.  Finally, and most
insidiously, a discourse is phallocentric when it represents highly gendered social
agents or processes in terms of universals and genderless abstracts such as
‘worker,’ ‘entrepreneur,’ and ‘competition.’ (Brodie, 1994: 48, cites Grosz, 1990:
149-51)
Discourse is not an easily definable concept.  It is constructed out of the interaction and
cooperation between language and speaker or reader, and is therefore inter-subjective in that it is
the result of the mediation “between language-users: not only in relationships of speech, but also
of consciousness, ideology, role and class.” (Gunew, 1990: 19, quoting Fowler, 1977: 80-81) 
Gunew also examines the work of Michel Foucault on the operation of power relations and
concludes that:
...discourse serves desire and power and arguably other combinations, such as
reason and folly, truth and falsity, at the same time that it covers over these
relations.  The prohibitions which regulate discourse determine who may speak
and who may not and what conventions need to be employed.  Foucault’s later
studies concentrate on what is left out of these discourses and what is covered
over by them. (Gunew, 1990: 19)
Gunew acknowledges that language in its relationship to discourse is “neither a neutral tool nor a
transparent reflection of reality.” (Gunew, 1990: 19)  Rather, perception of reality is shaped by
language.  What appears to be the real world is in fact a construction that depends upon social,
cultural, and historical context.  Thus, the ways in which discourse is gendered, as identified by
the above quotation by Brodie, are important to understand because of their role in the
construction of reality or what ‘is.’  Our comprehension of discourse and of language within that
discourse is extremely important because it helps in attempting to unearth relationships of power
in all forms of politics.
...the deep-seated discursive formations which determine the production of
knowledge in a given period are intimately bound up with non-discursive factors
defined as ‘an institutional field, a set of events, practices, and political decisions,
a sequence of economic processes that also involve demographic fluctuations,
techniques of public assistance, manpower needs, different levels of
unemployment, etc.’ (Foucault, 1972: 157) ...Thus, discourse or a particular
discursive formation is to be understood as an amalgam of material practices and
forms of knowledge linked together in a non-contingent relation. (McNay, 1992:
26-27, emphases mine)
McNay highlights the ways in which the material and non-material are linked together in
Foucault’s theory of discourse.  For this paper, what is required is a definition of discourse
reflective of these interconnections which takes into account the complexities of social life. 
Non-discursive elements, like the “political decisions” Foucault described, are made meaningful
in the context of a supporting discourse.  So the rationality of a decision to invade a given
country, for example, is established by the supporting military-security discourse.  For this
reason it is important to observe that discursive and non-discursive aspects intertwine to create a
more complete picture of the constructed reality of globalisation.  Discourse is understood here
to mean not only the language and ideas that create and perpetuate our comprehension of
economics, politics, and globalisation, but also includes the intellectual and cultural framework
that supports ideas and language, the social framework for the interrelations between individual
participants that gives meaning to the concepts and connections, and the material conditions
within which all of this operates.
The concept of discourse helps us to understand the roles of language, rationality,
socialisation, and knowledge production as they collectively contribute to and reproduce the
exclusive mind set of global finance.  Language in discourse is power.  It is the power to define,
describe, and determine understanding and to construct reality.  The complexity of this helps to
explain the difficulty encountered by those with alternative views in their efforts to ask new
questions and to begin from a different set of assumptions and life experiences.  Discussion of
concepts like social reproduction is unlikely to occur in a capital-based framework that focuses
so heavily on the accumulation of wealth.  Central concepts like profit or security exert a
dominance so complete that alternative perspectives or values are inconceivable.  Cohn’s well
known study on the language of defence intellectuals, for example, highlights the power of a
gendered discourse and illustrates the irrationality of policy making boardrooms where the
language and discourse of missiles and megatons leave no room for comprehensive concepts of
peace and non-militarised personal security. (Cohn, 1987)
Cohn examined this exclusive defence and security community of experts and found
them to be remarkably insulated and self-contained.  The form and content of the language
which is associated with this community encourage and reinforces this insulation.  This abstract
techno-strategic language disembeds and disembodies debate from social and historical contexts.
(Cohn, 1987: 690)  This is because, as Cohn asserts, “the ‘reality’ of which they speak is itself a
world of abstractions.” (Cohn, 1987: 709)  Emphasis in this language is placed on ‘controlling’
or ‘managing’ nuclear weapons by the experts.  This makes the users of strategic language
themselves powerful through their ability to create meaning and deploy this meaning to produce
a desired response. (Cohn, 1987: 704)
10Waring sees this impact on ecological movements in the language of ‘sustainability’ used to refer
to natural resources, materials, energy, and people to create “ecosystem goods and services.” (Waring, 1994:
156-7) She identifies the quantitative language of economics is with patriarchal power, “It’s the source of
knowledge, it keeps us out of the argument; it’s an argument carried on in an obscure language which means
that the majority of the people can’t participate.” (Waring, 1994: 161)  The point is that it is difficult to speak
to those within from outside the inner circle.  Language itself helps to build the borders or boundaries of
empowerment that make it “very, very tempting to think that since economics is all powerful, the way in
which we can empower our beloved ecosystem is to give it monetary value — quantify it.” (Waring, 1994:
159)  This, she concludes, leads ecological economists to construct biological and ecological accounting
systems “...bigger models, with feedbacks, and they even have debit sides!” Waring, (1994: 156)  Once
engaged in this discourse, it becomes difficult to move away from quantification tendencies.  Speakers are
forced to speak within the framework of the dominant economics discourse and to use its assumptions and
constructions in order to be ‘understood’ and valued.
This “militarisation of the mind” (Cohn, 1987: 714) limits the potential to think in new
ways because users are transformed by the language.  Constructed around a particularly
militarised masculinity, strategist identity is transformed by this language and discourse.  Cohn
recommends “recognizing and developing alternative conceptions of rationality . . . creating rich
and imaginative alternative voices — diverse voices whose conversations with each other will
invent these futures.” (Cohn, 1987: 718)  But how do ‘we’ accomplish change in a discourse that
transforms us as we engage in it?  Is there a location ‘outside’ the dominant discourse that would
permit a different type of engagement with economics, global finance, and IPE?  Perhaps, but the
difficulty lies as well in the way in which the dominant discourse itself appears to empower its
users, individually and collectively.10
Experts who have mastered the language of profit have developed an ‘economised’ mind
set which is comparable to the militarised mind of the defence community.  In this way, the
financial community is trained and socialised as an ‘inner circle.’  This makes them major
players in the transformation of global finance into ‘high’ politics or power politics (see, for
example, Whitworth, 1994: 117).  Although these individuals have some ability to alter their
behaviour and language, and therefore to affect discourse generally, they are also constrained by
their sense of values, as well as their conception of reason and rationality.
The shared ethics of wealth accumulation guides the actions of these elites and other
market players.  The full-time, 24 hour world of finance discourages competing value systems
11No longer is productive investment the dominant form in professional finance, now extractive
investment is central which “creates money or buying power...without creating anything of corresponding
value... The extractive investors’s gain is at the expense of other individuals or the society at large.” (Korten,
1995: 195-6)
12Harcourt concludes that the language of economics is associated with “purity” or superiority of its
association with episteme, or an instrumental form of disembodied, logic, and rationality knowledge.  She
compares this form to practised embedded Techne ‘doing’ knowledge.  As Harcourt asserts, “western
civilisation has learnt to consider episteme as the only pure knowledge and has elevated episteme to superior
knowledge and relegated techne to no knowledge at all.” (Harcourt, 1993: 13, citing Marglin, 1990. emphasis
mine.)  What results from this privileging of epistemic knowledge and the accompanying Western scientific
view of the ‘real world’ is a form of rationality which is reflective of the “objectivist metaphysics
(phallogo-centrism) of western philosophy.  Constraining (and enabling) how we conceptualise and make
sense of our experience/world, this metaphysics of identity naturalised a now familiar litany of hierarchical
dichotomies: subject-object, culture-nature, mind-body, public-private, etc., that are based on the dichotomy
of masculine-feminine.” (V.S. Peterson, forthcoming: 8, emphasis in the original.)
13Elson (1994) questions the ‘neutrality’ of money, suggesting that “money and all its forms (prices,
wages, rates of interest, and so on) become ‘bearers of gender,’ expressing male bias both in quantitative
terms...and in qualitative terms.  Money is not gender neutral.” (Elson, 1994: 41)
that often arise in social democratic states.11  Knowledge is disembodied12 into exchanges of
‘neutral’13 numerical information circulated among global players who are themselves often only
tangentially associated with the material wealth of the exchange.  Money, its exchange and
accumulation, is both virtual and ‘real’ and acts as the discursive and non-discursive ‘currency’
of global finance.  It is not an entity removed from social reality.  Rather the valu-ing of money,
and the power relations that determine and sustain its nature, form, operation, and meaning,
creates the decontextualised and depersonalised profit maximising ‘reality’ of global finance.  In
addition to the shared values and assumptions of capital accumulation, individual players in
global finance also share a common instrumental sense of reason and rationality that is consistent
with market behavior.
The form of instrumental rationality associated with profit-maximisation is prioritised as
applicable to individuals and states alike in a self-regulating market environment.  Tickner
argues that this form of rationality results from its basis in public sphere activities.  She asserts
that the liberal and economic nationalist perspectives:
...rely on an instrumental, depersonalised definition of rationality that equates the
rationality of individuals and states with a type of behaviour that maximises
self-interest...since rationality is associated with profit maximisation in capitalist
societies, the accepted definition of rationality has been constructed out of
activities related to the public sphere of the market and thus distinguished from
the private sphere of the household.  Feminists argue that, since it is men who
14This form of instrumental rationality, associated with the concept ‘economic man,’ is applied
broadly to both the operations of the ‘self-regulating’ market and the ‘sovereign’ gender neutral individual
in that market.  In addition to Tickner, see especially Ferber and Nelson (1993) for a discussion of the
construction of the market man.  On public/private and rationality in the context of institutionalist economics
see, for a recent example, J. Peterson and D. Brown, 1994.
15Tickner describes this form of rationality as one that “would be compatible with behaviour more
typical of many women’s lived experiences and would allow us to assume rational behaviour that is
embedded in social activities not necessarily tied to profit maximization.” (Tickner, 1992: 91)  This form of
rationality might include a sense of responsibility for the ecology, future populations, as well as the
household. (Tickner, 1992: 92)
16Nevertheless, Tickner, Harcourt and other critical feminist authors expressly seek to re-value other
more embedded and embodied ways of knowing and to challenge the dominance of Western values.  See also
Elson, 1992 and 1994; Mies, 1986; Peterson, 1994; and Vickers, 1991.  Examples of ‘critical’ feminist
economics include: Bakker, 1994a, 1994b and 1994c; Elson, 1994; Ferber and Nelson, 1993; and Tickner,
1992.  Here questions of modernity and post-modernity offer insights and potential avenues for feminist
interventions.
have primarily occupied this public sphere, rationality as we understand it is tied
to a masculine type of reasoning that is abstract and conceptual. (Tickner, 1992:
91)14
This dominance of Western values and rationality is important because it shapes interpersonal
relations and creates the parameters of choice.  Alternative, less abstract, more personal
conceptualisations of rationality that are grounded in daily life, such as Tickner’s ethic of care
and responsibility (Tickner, 1992: 91),15 are rendered irrational.16
But this construction of ‘rational’ economic man is problematic not simply because this
construction promotes a certain type of behaviour, but also because it fails to completely explain
the type of behaviour and decision making prevalent in global finance.  Individual actors in the
market, such as stock market traders, are presumed to make decisions which will result in
rational policy outcomes.  Wriston (1992) argues that the ‘market’ itself (as an entity) decides
the fates of governments and corporations alike:
In the international financial markets today, a vote on the soundness of each
country’s fiscal and monetary policies, in comparison with those of every other
country in the world, is held in the trading rooms of the world every minute of
every day... Just as politicians often manage to trick the electorate for a short
period but in the end are found out and removed from office, so central bankers,
finance ministers, and parliaments sometimes imagine that their words can affect
the price for currencies.  But over time the market will not be fooled:
Fundamentals will always prevail.  The politically astute officials are the ones
17An analysis of these influential elites in other settings (e.g., the Toronto Stock Exchange or the New
York Stock Exchange) would be valuable for comparison.  Is this environment reproduced in other settings
of the same global market system?
who see where fundamentals are driving the market and then jawbone it in that
direction, hence, the phenomenon of cockcrow followed by sunrise. (Wriston,
1992: 67-68)
But the ‘voting’ by traders suggests that it is not just a common set of information that underlies
this voting, but rather a common interpretation of the meaning of this information.  For Wriston,
the traders are simply following the rationality of a market that “will not be fooled.”  However,
individual actors, be they leaders or followers of aspects of the market, share a common
rationality that helps to create the social ‘reality’ of the market.
Market actors seem to follow a form of bandwagon rationality that to an outside observer
appears, ironically, irrational.  The now familiar quotation from Keynes is suggestive of this
apparently contradictory ir/rationality:
...professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in
which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly
corresponds to the average preferences of the competitor as a whole; so that each
competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those
which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom
are looking at the problem from the same point of view.  It is not a case of
choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, not
even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. (Keynes, 1973
[1936]: 155)
In this unpredictable ‘beauty contest,’ billion dollar decisions are made based on moods,
temperament, and irrational ‘hunches.’  The environment of the market, as well as the behaviour
of gendered individuals, interact in discursive and non-discursive ways to reproduce the
dominant, gendered identities of global finance.
McDowell and Court (1994a and 1994b) discuss the ways both discourse and gendered
identities have a direct impact on the sociology of global finance and the operation of the global
financial market.  In their research on the London Stock Exchange, they found the most well
defined and rigid gender roles in the entry level positions and the least in the senior positions
where individual characters are more recognisable.17  Secretaries are primarily women and are
hired to be feminine.  Floor traders are chiefly young men hired to be the stereotypical
18Ostensibly a question of metallic or paper convertibility.  See, for example, Strange, 1988: 91.
19J. Ewener (1996) suggests that the solution to “stimulating” corporate interest is “testosterone
treatments.”
20The concept of gender hierarchy is important because it is associated with the structural power that
lies at the heart of this relationship.  V.S. Peterson identifies the relationship succinctly: “Gender hierarchy
describes systems of structural power that privilege men and that which is associated with (hegemonic)
masculinity over women and that which is associated with femininity... By masculine ‘privileging’ I refer to
men’s appropriation of women’s re/productive labour, their disciplining of women’s bodies/sexuality, and
their dominance in society’s important institutions and in the production of ideologies, especially those
pertaining to gender.” (Peterson, forthcoming: Fn. 1, p. 1-2)
aggressive male.  These young men usually last only a short period of time in this high-stress
position before they burn out.  Their socialisation is not only by learning dominant behaviour of
the establishment, but also through the common use of gendered language:
In the City the Eighties were one long hard on, everybody had the horn — every
thrusting merchant banker; every double-dealing broker; every hard-nosed
limp-dicked lawyer (yes, even they could get it up) — and they weren’t too fussy
who they screwed.  Clients came.  Clients went.  Here today and screwed
tomorrow...  And was all this frenzy about reshaping British business?  Forget it. 
Size!  Who could pull of the biggest deals?  Who could command the biggest
fees?  Who had the biggest cock in town?  That’s what it was all about.
(McDowell and Court, 1994a: 238, quoting Moore, 1992: 34)
In the Canadian and U.S. contexts, the picture is much the same.  There is hard and soft
currency,18 a demand system of the macho market economy (Dobson, 1993: 153), the “masters of
the universe riding in on their horses — quick draw, quick fire and ride off into the sunset”
(Sharpe, 1994) on the floor, and FATS (Female Arbitrageurs Traders and Short Sellers). (Faludi,
1991: 68-9)19  The gendered nature of this discourse contributes to the creation and maintenance
of a dichotomised form of masculinity and femininity that affects the constitution and operation
of global finance.20  The dominant gender hierarchy that privileges this form of masculinity and
femininity is embedded and reproduced by the environment of perpetual socialisation that is
provided by trading houses, the exchange.  The effect of this socialisation, coupled with the
general influence of the globalisation discourse makes it difficult to challenge the gender
hierarchy of global finance.  However,  recognition of the importance of discourse and the
political and social role of gender in this discourse, creates the potential for the application of
this knowledge to develop a better understanding of otherwise hidden dynamics of global
finance.
Is it necessary for feminist authors to learn the language of global finance in order to
challenge some of its operating dynamics?  This is unclear because it is also possible that the
action of learning the language of global finance may be so co-optive that critical perspectives
are neutralised.  In order to avoid this co-optation as much as possible, the next section begins
with feminist interpretations of globalisation and incorporates global finance into these
interpretations.
Incorporating Global Finance into Feminist Perspectives on Restructuring
...feminist critical economics has begun to show us how we can demonstrate that
not only is the personal political, the impersonal is political too! (Elson, 1994: 38,
emphases mine)
Globalisation is, at minimum, a contested term within IPE and International Relations
(IR).  In part, some of the debate as to whether globalisation is a new phenomenon or a
continuation of historical process relates to our understanding of change, stability, order, and
disorder at various levels of society.  At a very basic level, globalisation is a process of
restructuring that involves not only capitalist or liberal institutions, but a broader cultural, social,
political, as well as economic global change.  Robert Cox promotes a historically grounded (if
economistic) understanding of globalisation.
According to Cox, globalisation or global perestroika is “the result of structural changes
in capitalism, in the actions of many people, corporate bodies, and states, that cumulatively
produce new relationships and patterns of behaviour.” (Cox, 1992: 26)  He argues that the
structures of globalisation include a weak territorial division of global finance, governance
without government, and an internationalised state.  State independence is being eroded as new
sovereignties are taking shape that both reinforce and challenge the existing order. (Cox, 1992:
30)  The dialectical relationship between the “principle of interdependence” or the idea of
unconstrained global finance, and the “territorial principle” — a more traditional state bound
form of political power (Cox, 1992: 36-37) — orders and reorders the current structures and
relationships.  Crucial to his interpretation of globalisation is Cox’s vision of the coexistence of
both the means of maintaining and the means of destroying the current structures in this
dialectical relationship.  Crisis, military or financial, of the existing order therefore creates the
opportunity to fundamentally change social, economic, and political relations.
...a financial crisis is the most likely way in which the existing world order could
begin to collapse.  A new financial mechanism would be needed to seize the
21Cox (1987) identifies the role of social forces as essential to the challenge of one hegemonic bloc
and to the formation of alternative blocs.
initiative for transcending the liberal separation of economy from polity and for
reembedding the economy in a society imbued with the principles of equity and
solidarity. (Cox, 1992: 31)
This solidarity, perhaps arising from the organisation of existing social forces,21 could be
associated with a counter-hegemonic bloc which has challenged the hegemonic bloc of existing
global capitalist order, and reestablished the linkage between the economy and society.
While Cox’s view of globalisation is useful, Gill explores the complex tapestry of the
current stages of neo-liberal restructuring with more attention to the state, societal, and cultural
aspects of globalisation.  Beginning with the questions, “globalisation of what, where, and for
whom?” Gill suggests that:
...globalisation is part of a broad process of restructuring of the state and civil
society, and of the political economy and culture.  It is also an ideology largely
consistent with the world view and political priorities of large-scale,
internationally-mobile forms of capital.  Politically, it is consistent with the
outlook of affluent minorities in the OECD and in the urban elites and new
middle classes in the Third World.  The current phase of economic globalisation
has come to be characterised...by oligopolistic neo-liberalism: oligopoly and
protection for the strong and a socialisation of their risks, market discipline for the
weak...it is many-faceted and multidimensional and involves ideas, images,
symbols, music, fashions, and a variety of tastes and representations of identity
and community. (Gill, 1995: 405, emphasis in the original)
This broad emphasis on the state, civil society, political economy, and culture assists in the
development of connective multidisciplinary research.
Feminist IPE literature highlights elements otherwise not identified as relevant within 
macro-economic (especially monetary) aspects of the processes of globalisation.  As Elson
suggests:
...(m)ost critical economics, however, shares with neo-classical economics a lack
of gender analysis at the meso- and macro-levels.  Although individuals are
conceptualised as gendered in the critical economics of the family, markets and
firms are not generally conceptualised as gendered in a comparable way, although
they may operate in ways that are particularly constraining and disadvantageous
to women.  At the macro-level, gender is absent altogether: the discourse is all
about monetary aggregates. (Elson, 1994: 38)
22Rathgeber (1990) details the trends in research as well as practise and the evolution of development
approaches from “Women in Development” (WID) to “Women and Development” (WAD) to “Gender and
Development” (GAD).  See also Elson, 1993; Kabeer and Humphries, 1991; and Harcourt (mimeo).
There is a need to investigate the absent gendered dimensions of macro-economic policy, as we
seek to establish cross-leveled linkages.  Specifically, discursive and non-discursive analyses
focusing on state and non-state market control, management of the restructuring processes, and
existing state and global regulatory mechanisms can be usefully enriched by feminist
perspectives that link practises and policies made at the macro level to meso and micro level
phenomena.
Although degrees of sophistication vary across this broad sub-section of literature, there
is certainly a deep understanding of the human and ecological implications of the current
processes of globalisation.  These implications are linked directly to the ways in which the state,
as a failing actor in this time, is being forced to deal with the transnationalisation of capital and
that of labour.  Questions of state autonomy and dynamics of power and control involved in
mobile capital, interest rate policies, and exchange rate policies offer points of linkage for
critical discussion.
In global, national and sub-national forms, IPE/IR feminist authors broadly theorise
relations and locations of power and control, often focusing on the effects of the construction of
‘options’ and categories (state, market, household, workers, etc.) in the mainstream discourse,
and the discursive and non-discursive ‘ordering’ associated with restructuring.  These authors
critique, both at the level of discourse and policy implication, the phallocentrism of conventional
approaches.  Considerable feminist research exists that critically examines the gender bias of
mainstream approaches to development and restructuring in developed and developing contexts.
“Women/gender in development”22 research highlights the transnational power relations
of management and control that underlie the creation of current development policies, and
problematizes the rationale behind both the neo-classical and macro structuralist approaches.
(Elson, 1993: 240)  Structuralist approaches, she suggests, look primarily at fiscal and monetary
policy and their linkage to a “social matrix” which emphasize class.  Conventional micro
approaches are equally problematic, according to these feminist perspectives because they
presume the rational economic man, and only include women as consumers along “choice
theoretic” lines. (Elson, 1993: 240)  In discursive terms,  assumptions and presumptions of
efficiency and ‘economic’ growth oriented strategies figure prominently in this conventional
literature.  Feminist authors question this narrowness and seek to value both production and
23It is important to note that there is critical non-feminist literature that also draws attention to the role
of the household (e.g., Cox, 1987).  However, by failing to explore the gender dimensions of household
economics, this literature falls short of providing a clearer image of the politics of micro/macro distinctions.
24A second body of literature tied to international development approaches questions the gendered
implementation and effects of austerity programmes, and the arguably systematic ways that women have been
left out of the ‘equation’ (see, for example, Afshar and Dennis, 1991; Bakker, 1994; Beneria, 1989; Beneria
and Feldman, 1992; Moser, 1989 and 1993; and International Women’s Seminar, 1990).  One excellent area
of a growing body of feminist literature specifically on the subject of the debt as it relates to
developed/industrialised countries, is the extensive work of M. Cohen on the Canadian context.
25For an interesting discussion of interpretation, representation, and subjectivity in relation to IMF
discourse and Peruvian debt see Weber (1990).  She utilises Samuel Weber’s “alternative understanding of
debt as the constitution of an interpretive foundation which enables participants to claim legitimate speaking
positions” to contextualize a Reading/writing debate between Peruvian presidents Belaunde and Garcia.
(Weber, 1990: 353)
reproduction in development.  This relationship is key in a number of feminist IPE approaches
because it is believed that discussions of restructuring/globalisation that fail to grasp the role of
reproduction in relation with production will be shortsighted and incomplete at best.  Some of
this literature draws attention to the ways this mainstream development discourse locates women
as symbols or misses their existence altogether by creating gender neutral, abstract constructions
of the state, the market, the worker, and even “the household.”23
One stream of this literature which has particular relevance to this discussion deals
specifically with the problems of populations of countries that suffer from tremendous debt.24 
Internationally debt reduction policies encourage the implementation of structural adjustment
policies (SAPs) that result in the removal of social safety nets and the disruption of social
structures.  Both the debt and the deficit are often used by governments as tools to defend and
‘legitimise’ the latest round of restructuring.25  Social programmes are targeted.  In Canada, for
example, deep cuts are being made to education, social, health, and welfare programmes. 
Restructuring language renders the loss of social democracy a fait accompli, a necessity for the
sake of national economic survival.
While there has been a loss of policy autonomy, it is the discourse on this loss of
autonomy that provides the vehicle for ‘rational’ restructuring.  Yet debt reduction is deployed as
another discursive tool to promote a particular form of global order that relieves nation-states of
social responsibility while it maintains political legitimacy.  Pauly asserts that “corporate
financiers, as well as representatives of national governments, among the largest borrowers of
international capital, use the language of inevitability to obscure the notion that other normative
choices are conceivable...it is an anti-political language.” (Pauly, 1995: 384)  Policy autonomy
26These contributions include Bakker (1994 a, b and c), Cohen (1994), Brodie (1994), and Peterson
(1996).  Bakker (1994a) includes selections from Cohen and Brodie, that highlight a number of the aspects
discussed in this paper in relation to national economic policy making and welfare restructuring.  Bakker
graphically explores the “Gender Implications of Economic Policy” (Bakker, 1994a: 27-29) including specific
reference to “Monetary and exchange-rate policies” and “Market Regulations.”  While her discussion is
suggestive rather than exhaustive (see also Bakker 1994b and 1994c), this schema may be helpful for future
research.
27This might include the creation and perpetuation of gendered protector/protectee relationships by
the state (see especially V.S. Peterson, 1992: 46-50).  Legislatures are often willing to pass laws to protect
battered women, but are unable to come to terms with the ways in which society and its laws help to
perpetuate this behaviour by continuing to perpetuate hierarchical relationships: “feminists have explored the
dynamics of marriage as a protection racket: systemic male violence against women and our position in the
labour market ‘force’ us into marriage as protection from these systemic threats to our security.” (Peterson,
may not be gone in all circumstances when crisis situations force decision makers to act
regardless of the outside pressures to conform to market community preferences.  The action or
inaction of government policy makers, therefore, is necessarily shaped by issues of political
accountability and legitimacy in ways that the action of corporate elites is not.
The most pertinent body of feminist IPE research links welfare restructuring in state
contexts to transnational globalisation processes.  Recent feminist critiques of welfare
restructuring begin to identify the gender dimension of certain practises of global finance and
economic policy making.26  These authors draw attention to the changing relationship between
the economic and the political:
The current era of globalisation prioritises the economic over the political, and
reduces the policy enforcement ability of elected governments in discursive and
non-discursive ways.  Paradoxically (or not), this is an era which extols the
democratic citizen and, at the same time, reduces the terrain of his sovereignty. 
Second, the erosion of the sovereignty of national-states has been accompanied by
discursive representations which assign primacy to the market and render political
mediation impossible.  This discourse posits the process of restructuring as an
inescapable necessity which demands that previous definitions of the common
good, such as social welfare, be replaced with market liberal definitions such as
‘efficiency’ and ‘competition.’  The effect is to depoliticise the economic by
representing it as self-regulating and directive.  Third, and more tangibly, the
reduction of the state through deregulation, privatisation and programme cuts
restricts and reassigns the spaces for politics and political agency. (Brodie, 1994:
56, emphases mine)
This new order implies the potential destruction of certain patriarchal aspects of the Keynesian
welfare state,27 and it does not appear that there is an alternative plan for social reproduction. 
1992: 51)
28Cohen (1994) ties the monetary and fiscal policy implications of the global level competitive
processes, to the national politics of inflation and interest rate fluctuations, tight monetary policy (more
generally), as well as the increasing relevance of mobile capital.
29Cohen suggests that “This has not occurred in Canada because widespread unemployment, as a
result of the structural adjustment initiatives, has brought about general downward pressures on wages.  The
gendered rigidities in the labour market have been maintained, and in typically feminised industries have
increased.  The major changes in women’s employment appear to be in the acceleration of non-standard forms
of work and a reduction in their labour-force participation rate.” (Cohen, 1994: 115)
That is, the contradiction inherent in placing women in both the workforce and the home creates
“a formula for a crisis in social reproduction.” (Brodie, 1994: 58)
National and global processes affect the international gender division of labour in ways
that challenge existing relationships of social reproduction.28  Participation by women in the
labour force has shifted toward non-unionized service sector industry.  Cohen (1994) suggests
that the changing division of labour has gendered consequences.  She reminds us that although
the effects of global restructuring will differ according to context, a feminisation of labour may
be expected internationally.29  Non-standard labour, part-time, contract, temporary, and
‘home-work’ are prevalent forms of insecure labour which are filled disproportionately by
women.  The high levels of insecurity and instability characteristic of these forms of employment
illustrate some of the ways in which the changing labour force requirements of transnational
corporations and the risks involved in the removal of the social safety net might affect women
and men in unique ways.
Peterson (1996) and Brodie (1994) note that the current period is punctuated by a number
of structural shifts in the locations and forms of power.  In addition to the new international
division of labour described by Cohen, Brodie asserts that these shifts involve centralisation,
capital concentration, market expansion, increased inter and intra state mobility, and the
globalisation of productive and financial capital. (Brodie, 1994: 34)  As a result of these
structural shifts,  nation-states are forced to alter their approaches and operations in both
development and politics. (Brodie, 1994: 46, cites Soja, 1989: 159)  Brodie and others suggest
similar patterns of state behaviour that roughly correspond to IMF policy requiring more exports
at the expense of domestic social security, a move away from state regulation, and a considerable
withdrawal of services.
The mobile influence and power of money affect both policy makers and self-interested
investors as well as the disempowered who are outside of these circles.  It is not merely the
presence or absence of money that is tied to empowerment, it is also the extent one is able to
30This control is both tangible in the form of individuals moving numbers and exchanging goods and
cash, and intangible — especially when that control is often reflected in blips on a computer screen.
According to Korten: “Computerisation and globalisation melded the world’s financial markets into a single
global system in which an individual at a computer terminal can maintain constant contact with price
movements in all major markets and execute trades almost instantaneously in any or all of them.  A computer
can be programmed to do the same without human intervention, automatically executing transactions
involving billions of dollars in fractions of a second.” (Korten, 1995: 187-188)  For further discussion of the
discursive and non-discursive aspects of money, see Rotman (1989).
31"Money supply is also a device by which economic activity is regulated — read controlled — in
our system, and that by decisions we do not make in our communities, and which are not necessarily made
for our benefit.” (W.R. Dobson, 1993: 154)
32Quoting Cencini on the use of interests rates as a control mechanism, “During periods of inflation,
for example, the Central Bank can support a rise in interest rates in the hope of reducing the growth of money
by increasing its cost, whereas during periods of recession it can promote a fall in interest rates with the aim
of encouraging economic recovery by increasing the quantity of money.” (Cencini, 1995: 108)
control its location and movement.30  The influence of those who exercise control is equally felt
by those removed from decision making.31  The nature of the market, and the movement of
money within that market, is that it can be the foundation for both security for some and
profound insecurity for others outside the financial circles who lack the flexibility afforded to
mobile capital.
The distinctive difference between the ways in which financial capital moves relative to
other types of capital creates a narrowing of policy making options for those in decision making
positions.  Where markets are integrated, capital is mobile, and monetary policy options are
limited to exchange rate manipulation, not through interest rates.  Often, interest rates are
manipulated to deal with inflation and an overheated market.32  But this manipulation is not
useful or effective in any particular nation-state and is limited by prevailing contexts of
restructuring where interest rates are “constrained to be the same in all countries.” (Frieden,
1991: 431).
...financial capital moves across the borders of developed countries with great
ease, while other asset markets are less integrated and some capital remains quite
fixed.  In this context, while global financial integration may reduce the efficacy
of some sector-specific policies, it does not impede most of them.  And while
international financial integration does not make national macroeconomic policy
obsolete, it does shift the effect of macroeconomic policy from the interest rate to
the exchange rate. (Frieden, 1991: 433)
33Frieden compares the policy preferences of different socioeconomic actors in the global context of
mobile capital.  He concludes that different groups are served by high and low degrees of exchange rate
flexibility and national monetary policy autonomy coordinated with high or low preferred levels of the
exchange rate.  Each cell of Frieden’s Figure I identifies the preferences of a unique combination of groups.
What is especially interesting about this figure is the contradictory interests of actors who can all have
negative and positive impact on a particular nation-states economy.  For example, international traders and
investors prefer a high level of the exchange rate and a low level of flexibility and national monetary policy
autonomy, while producers of non tradable goods and services want high exchange and high flexibility.  At
the same time, export-oriented tradable goods producers, like international traders and investors, are forced
to deal with exchange market volatility, but can shift business to other countries rather than concerning
themselves with domestic conditions. (Frieden, 1991: 444-445)
34Kurzer (1993) includes banks, institutional investors, and non bank financial corporations.
35See in feminist literature especially Bakker, 1994a, b and c; Cohen, 1994; Elson 1991 and 1994,
on questions of the gendering of service sector/manufacturing.
36For example, Russians are officially required to accept only Rubles, a currency that is not
transnationally acceptable and is dramatically unstable.  There is a definite inequality between workers whose
salaries are calculated in rubles versus those whose salaries are calculated in US dollars.  In fact, lacking
sufficient rubles to pay their workers, crystal and silverware factories are once again paying their employees
in product.
Flexible exchange permits ‘the market’ to govern currency values, restricts the options for
national policy makers, and increases pressure on the central bank reserves and national
currency.33  A willingness to ‘sacrifice’ national policy autonomy and economic security is likely
to be present among the non-governmental financial community.  While independent financial
investors34 are able to shift their sectoral orientation as the stresses of monetary policy affect the
profitability of any particular sector, it is believed that the flexibility of state monetary
authorities are limited by their need to cope with a myriad of internal and external factors.
(Frieden, 1991: 443-444)
Policy changes made to deal with the stresses of mobile capital and currency fluctuations
create sector-specific instability domestically and globally (such as in the textile or service
sectors) that carries with it gendered effects.35  Yet the majority of available current feminist and
conventional economic research on this relationship does not consider the impact this instability
and these policies might have on the lives of gendered individuals in decaying social
democracies.  A radical devaluation of currency has gender and non-gender specific
repercussions for those people who might lack transnational access in the form of a more stable
‘inter-nationalised’ currency, such as the U.S. dollar.36  These individuals find it difficult to
experience the advantages enjoyed by more mobile transnational corporations and investors. 
Flexibility and mobility are affected by gender when it is frequently women who are physically
and financially bound by care-giving circumstances to a particular state and even local setting. 
Bakker recommends examining the causal connections between both exchange rate and interest
rate policies in order to determine the gender dimensions of these policies.
Uncovering the gender dimensions of interest rate targets involves an examination
of the immediate effects of interest rates on different types of economic activities
plus a careful consideration of the secondary consequences due to changes in the
cost of living; it is with this latter impact that non-production activity needs to be
surveyed, as cost-cutting is often absorbed by women’s increased labour in the
household and in the care-giving sector...(a)symmetrical ability in mobility and
switching from non-tradables to tradeables in the case of SAP...(h)igh-interest
rate policies may have asymmetrical outcomes in terms of unemployment rates
and pressures to reduce government deficits. (Bakker, 1994b: 28)
Frieden sees the potential for capital mobility to “remake political coalitions by way of its
impact on the effects of national policies.” (Frieden, 1991: 426).  He concludes that capital is
favoured over labour in the short term, but in the long run it depends on specific sector
connections where manufacturing or farming related assets are disfavoured, and capitalists “with
mobile or diversified assets” are favoured. (Frieden, 1991: 426)
This idealised construction of class compromise no longer works once the concept
of capital mobility and financial integration is introduced.  Because political
tradeoffs depend on the expectations of workers that current sacrifices yield
higher earnings and more jobs later, the high mobility of capital heightens the
sense of insecurity among workers... Competition among national labour
movements and governments ensure that international capital can play off one
against the other to obtain the concessions it wants.  If labour were united on a
global level, it could prevent transnational capital from looking for the best deal. 
However, the international reach of labour lags far behind that of business and
finance. (Kurzer, 1993: 11)
While political coalitions may be remade, as Frieden suggests, mobile capital inevitably pits
government against its own labour.  One of the reasons why international labour has been unable
to mount an effective defence against capital has been its limited territoriality, whereas financial
capital has “created a nonterritorial ‘region’ in the world economy — a decentered yet integrated
space-of-flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside the spaces-of-places that we call
national economies.” (Ruggie, 1993: 172)  This makes statist concepts of economic policy
making and social coalition building problematic.
The mobility of capital has the potential to negatively affect the social and political lives
of the wider citizenry of nation-states.  At the level of daily life, state-bound residents of
democratic countries are under attack.  Kurzer links capital mobility with the death of social
democracy.
In the past, governments could spend lavishly on public programs to reconcile the
conflicting demands of labour and business.  However, such expansionary
programs produce expectations among financial asset holders that future inflation
rates will drift above the rates of the country’s main trading partners.  This
perception triggers capital outflows and foreign currency speculation.  If the
outflow continues unabated, governments must reverse their policies to arrest
further outflows. (Kurzer, 1993: 12)
The relationship of citizens to states continues to change as restructuring reveals the increasing
insecurity of individuals in state settings.  Peterson (1996: 14, en. 5) asserts that the separation of
some forms of power from territory creates a potential crisis of accountability.  This loss of
accountability and the creation of a “legitimacy deficit” (Underhill, 1996: 6) results as
nation-states project themselves as incapable of meeting the needs of its vulnerable population.
The vulnerability of citizens in the current period of restructuring is increased
particularly for those already marginalized.  Feminist authors have debated the role of the state in
the protection of its citizens in military and economic terms.
From a feminist perspective, state-making historically institutionalised and
continues to naturalise masculine dominance.  However, protections afforded by
the liberal welfare state have not only ensured the survival of countless women
(and others) but also enabled political reforms of varying — but not insignificant
— potency.  Insofar as the choice is between welfare state accountability and the
normative indifference of capitalist market relations (Harrington, 1992), state
forms and their accountability mechanisms must be supported, even as we resist
their masculinist (and elitist, racist) power relations. (Peterson, 1996: 14)
Women have continued to depend upon the state through the 1980s (Mari May and Stepenson,
1994: 543) into the current stage of restructuring.  Dahlerup (1994), for example, claims that not
only do women in both Western and post-communist societies with market economies “require”
state intervention in familial and societal activities, but they are in fact less able to acquire power
through the market than they are through the state. Peterson claims that if “global restructuring
erodes even the moderate protection afforded by state, all state-centric strategies are
compromised in regard to emancipatory politics.”  She draws attention to the need to critique and
37Peterson (1996) discusses the issue of accountability and the issue of the autonomy of states.
distinguish between “democratisation, socialism, liberalism, and capitalism” in order to “situate
accumulation and the pursuit of profit in context and reveal relationships that we need
desperately to understand.” (Peterson, 1996: 14)
Emancipatory movements such as women’s non-governmental organisations may help to
reveal these relationships.  Sen (1996) concludes that it is necessary to examine non market
activity of women in the form of the influence of women’s non-governmental organisations in
the government-private sector relationships currently developing.  While there is space for
transnational emancipatory politics, nation-states retain the power to affect citizens lives as
protector and provider.  The complex and dual nature of the relationship of a gendered citizen to
the state seems more appealing than alternative forms of governance that further mystify
locations of power and influence, shifting them in part to market related forms of governance.
Yet in the context of globalisation, governance is shifting out of the control of
government thereby moving accountability further from citizen control.37  A “very closely-knit
network” of parties (finance ministers, central banks, securities regulators, exchange regulators,
“self-regulatory organisations” (SROs), firms, and associations) is created that shift governance
away from government and assures inaccessibility by the general public. (Underhill, 1996: 4) 
Sinclair argues that among the most important regulatory actors are bond-rating agencies.  He
concludes that “the creation of knowledge and the passing judgment, based on a strategic
position in the production of financial, economic and policy information, will increasingly fall to
debt security rating agencies.” (Sinclair, 1994: 152)  Decisions are made in secret, by agencies
separate from any democratically elected process.
The composition of the rating committees and the internal deliberations within the
rating agencies on any particular issue are kept strictly confidential.  The
judgment that is made by the committee weighs the quantitative and qualitative
factors in each case because ‘there is no formula for combining these scores to
arrive at a rating conclusion.’  Accordingly, ‘such judgments are highly
subjective.  Yet that is at the heart of every rating.’ (Sinclair, 1994: 140)
In this context, authority is a social construction which has shifted from “traditional
intermediating institutions, notably banks, to the empowerment of others, such as debt security
rating agencies.” (Sinclair, 1994: 136)  The information that goes into this rating process
includes “publicly available... information disclosed by the issuer themselves” and “information
[that is] provided by competitors of disgruntled former employees of the issuer.” (Sinclair, 1994:
139)  What makes the bond rating process so interesting yet mystified is the nature of the politics
of power and knowledge underlying the rating process.  The degree to which these processes are
governed by discursive and non-discursive ‘hegemonic masculinist’ dynamics that might affect
the ‘subjectivity’ of the resulting decisions is an important, yet hidden, aspect of this process.
While existing feminist restructuring literature highlights the ways in which ‘the market,’
‘money,’ and monetary and fiscal policy are discussed disembodied and disembedded from
social life, the gender politics of global finance remains largely unexplored as it relates to current
globalising trends.  The global financial market is both the location for politics to occur, and a
variable in the global processes of political/restructuring.  National fiscal and monetary policies
are structured around the dynamics of global capital in ways that often empower capital and
dis-empower others, including workers and other social forces who are supposed to be served
and protected by these same authorities.
Conclusions
The current form of neo-liberalism with its re-privatisation discourse emphasising anti-politics,
anti-justice, anti-agency, Darwinist, “efficiency” based non-regulation, mystifies the locations of
power and control. (Brodie, 1994: 48)  This mystification (by governments, firms and
individuals) affects the appearance of options for response to neo-liberalism.  Demystification of
these locations of power requires movement away from focusing primarily on familiar forms of
high politics vested primarily in government and political think tank circles.  While national
governments remain important in the current period, governance occurs in many other places
somewhat removed from government.
By integrating discursive and non-discursive elements into our discussion we are better
able to understand the intricacies of the current period and to demystify its operations for those
not in the inner circles.  Language, rationality, socialisation, and knowledge production all
contribute to the creation and reproduction of communities of actors in global finance.  In order
to unpack the politics of global finance, it is useful to view gendered individuals, corporate firms
and associations, and the global market relationally.  Feminist and other critical researchers are
well positioned to understand the ways in which the high politics of global finance are best
revealed through interdisciplinary research.
Feminist perspectives help to identify the important role of identity politics in a
quantified and narrow discourse that features ‘neutral’ consumers and emphasizes creating
wealth from nothing.  As Elson suggests, “(a)t the macro-level, gender is absent altogether: the
discourse is all about monetary aggregates.” (Elson, 1994: 38)  This is accomplished through the
creation of a discourse and language where certain concepts, like gender or race, are excluded. 
The co-optation and the ‘power’ of discourse is most apparent when counter movements are
compelled to use the same language in their efforts (e.g., the quantification of the environment
by activists).
But new perspectives can have an impact.  Just by their existence they challenge and
change the discourse and influence political decisions.  ‘Bottom-up’ perspectives on global
finance problematize the role of neutralised ‘monetary aggregates.’  The complexity of social
relations which underlie these aggregates is masked by this appearance of neutrality.  The
challenge is in systematically problematizing the state and/or market centred understanding of
global finance, where individuals enter the picture only as workers or investors.  Global finance
is more than the flow of capital as currency, materials, or people.  It is not simply the regulation
or lack of regulation by state or non-state agencies.  Global finance, as it is structured, itself
contributes to the operation of globalisation processes transnationally.  It remains captured in an
economic framework that hinders the creation of alternatives outside of the current constrained
framework.
Future research would benefit from more work on discourse, the sociology of knowledge,
methodology critique, and a critique of the specific abstractions of global finance around money,
space, and time.  A second area of potentially critical research focuses on the changing
relationship between citizens and nation-states in the current neo-liberal context.  Research on
taxation in national policy making (as Bakker, 1994b also mentions) requires us to consider the
connection between legitimacy and the perception of evenhandedness in policy making.  It has
long been the case that those in the higher tax brackets, in the United States especially, are able
to manipulate the system better than those at middle and lower levels of the economy.  This
relates to the issue of capital mobility.  The wealthy are able to move their capital around in
ways that lower income citizens cannot.  This inequitable situation undoubtably has racial,
gender, and age dimensions, in addition to the more evident class elements.
A third broad category of research that would be useful will examine not only the
production/reproduction (and public/private) linkages, but seek to go beyond the limits implied
by such a division.  The concept of production alone requires more discussion in the current
context where productive investment has been replaced by extractive investment for many who
are seeking to create wealth from speculation.  Additionally “exclusive emphasis on questions of
production, work, exchange and distribution” limits our understanding of the current period and
there is a need to explore elements of “ideas and ideology.” (Whitworth, 1994: 125)  Our beliefs
and values, as much as our ideas and ideologies help to determine the ways in which we interact
with one another and establishes a common view of social ‘reality.’
Social life and the nature of relationships between individuals, governments, and firms
has become transnationalised.  The operations of global finance evidence and perpetuate this
de-territorialized global environment.  The nature of the movement of money transgresses spatial
and temporal (public/private-production/reproduction) boundaries.  Nevertheless, social
reproduction across levels is central to the re-creation of global order.  Discovering the
‘household’ as the centre of ‘economics’ and shifting our focus away from the systemic broad
stroke pictures that result from narrowly focusing on the ‘system’ level permits an alternative
view of the transnationalised environment.  This coupled with research on the motivations of
competition and the assumption of ‘inevitability’ which stem from the dominance of the
economics discourse, helps to alter perceptions of globalisation processes as being out of our
control.  There are alternatives to the existing system.  These alternatives can only be discussed
if the dominant discourse is challenged and changed to make that discussion necessary.
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